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The Technicality Requirement, Patent 
Scope and ,Patentable Subject Matter in 
Australia 
William van Caenegem* 
Associate Professor of Law, Bond University, Queensland 
The technicality requirement confines patentable subject matter to practical processes and 
products. It excludes theoretical knowledge and methods of conducting services as such from 
patentability. In a post-industrial age, there may be good arguments to abandon this limiting 
requirement, because innovation has become highly scientific and because services now form 
such an important part of industrial activity. However, because the underlying effect of the 
requirBment is to limit the scope of patent claims, it should arguably be retained: patents of 
excessively broad scope have a negative aggregate welfare effect. In any case, even within the 
constraints of technicality, courts applying the NRDC principles retain sufJicient Wibi l i ty  to 
adapt the concept of "manner of manufacture" to rapid evolution in science and industry. 
Introduction 
In passing the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) (Patents 
Act), Parliament chose not to constrain the broad 
and flexible power of the courts to decide what is 
suitable subject matter for the grant of letters 
patent.' The broad factors identified in National 
Research Development Corporation v 
Commissioner of patents2 (NRDC) thus continue to 
determine patentability. The High Court in the that 
* The author thanks Professor Mark kmley  of University of 
California, Berkeley, h a l t  Hall School of Law, and Professor 
Andrew Christie of Melbourne University for their helpful 
comments on an earlier version of this paper. The opinions 
expressed in this article are entirely the author's. He also derived 
much advantage from the paper presented by D Drummond, 
"Are the Courts Down Under Properly Handling Patent Disputes?', 
presented at the 14th Annual IPSANZ conference at Sanctuary 
Cove, Qld, on 16 July 2000, and the accompanying comments by 
Annabelle Bennet SC and other participants. His Honour's paper is 
published at (2000) 10 Intellectual Property Forum 42. 
' Other than by excluding human beings and biological processes 
for their generation from patentability: see Patents Act, s 18 (2). 
(1959) 102 CLR 252. 
case was adamant that the courts' ability to adapt the 
notion of patentability to new scientific discoveries 
and technologies should not be fettered by artificial 
constraints. One of the factors identified in NRDC is 
the so-called "technicality " requirement,3 elsewhere 
known as the requirement of industrial 
applicability.4 A question arises whether, in a post- 
industrial age, that requirement itself has now 
become an artificial fetter on patentability, and 
.should therefore be abandoned. 
In examining this question, the author argues that 
the main effect of the technicality requirement is that 
it restricts the scope of patentable claims. 
Abandoning it would broaden the permissible scope 
of patents, thus shifting the demarcation line 
between appropriable and public domain 
Also known as the practicality requirement, or requirement of 
industrial applicability; ie the requirement that a process or 
method to be patentable should result in an "artificial state of 
affairs" or "belong to the practical arts"; see further below. 
The European Patent Convention, s 52 provides: 
"European patents shall be granted for any inventions which 
are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and 
which involve an inventive step." 
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The author proceeds on the basis that it 
is well accepted that the scope of patents is of vital 
importance to the overall effectiveness of a patent 
system. He concludes that aggregate public welfare 
flowing from a patents system will be adversely 
affected by allowing the kind of theoretical patents 
of broader scope that would result from abandoning 
the technicality requirement, and that there is thus 
good reason for it to be retained. 
Patentable subject matter in Australia: 
the NRDC rules 
With the passing of the Patents Act, the 
Commonwealth Parliament chose to leave it to the 
courts to decide what is "suitable subject matter for 
the grant of letters Only human beings and . 
biological processes for their generation were 
expressly excludedm7 Retention of the archaic 
"manner of manufacture" terminology amounted to 
a legislative decision to endorse the courts' broad 
power to adapt the category of "patentable subject 
matter" in the light of evolving technology.8 
The enactment of the Patents Act supported the High 
Court's flexible and evolutionary approach as initiated 
in NRDC. 
NRDC was a watershed case in Australian patent 
jurisprudence. Its general impact is similar to that of 
Donoghue v ~tevenson~ in the law of negligence. 
Previously disparate jurisprudence was synthesised 
into broad and general propositions that could be 
applied to any new technology, without necessarily 
The distinction between the intellectual commons, and private 
knowledge subject to restrictive property rights, has considerable 
policy implications; see to that effect, P Drahos, A Philosophy of 
Intellectual Property (Dartmouth, 1996). The intellectual 
commons is often referred to as the "public domain". 
Parliament acted on recommendations made by the intellectual 
Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) in its report Patents, 
Innovation and Competition in Austrafia (August 1984). 
' patents ~ c t ,  s 18 (2). 
Patents Act, s 18 ( 1 )  states: 
"[A] patentable invention is an invention that, so far as 
claimed in any claim: (a) is a manner of manufacture within 
the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies." 
While considering the scope of the intellectual property 
power in the Commonwealth Constitution (s 51 (xviii)), the High 
Court recently commented on the flexible content of the 
legislative power: see Grain Pool of WA v The Commonwealth 
(2000) 202 CLR 479. 
(19321 AC 562. 
superseding all learning on specific categories of 
invention. NRDC did not represent an attempt to 
change the law, so much as to provide it with 
consistency through the stabilising force of broad 
principles.10 The real importance of NRDC lies in 
the High Court's determination to ensure that the 
courts should be in a position to respond flexibly to 
new technological developments in the era of rapid 
scientific innovation that was unfolding." 
The Court stressed the risk inherent in attempting 
to impose a narrow fetter on the meaning of 
"manufacture", given the "excitingly unpredictable" 
nature of the pursuit of invention.12 In other words, 
determining what is patentable subject matter could 
not be equated to an exercise in linguistic 
interpretation of the term "man~facture".'~ 
Therefore the right question was: 
"Is this a proper subject of letters patent 
according to the principles which have been 
developed for the application of section 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies?" 
The question of patentability had to be addressed 
with an open mind, recognising that patents law 
must evolve in line with changes in scientific 
knowledge as well as economic development.14 
'O In a remarkable paper presented during the IPSANZ 
Conference 2000, and also published at (2000) Intellectual 
Property Forum 43, entitled "Some Observations on the 
Requirement of Inherent Patentability in the Context of Business 
Methods Patents", Dr Andrew Christie suggested that NRDC 
revolutionised rather than synthetised the law. He notes (at 20): 
"It might be said that NRDC is in fact a bombshell decisions, 
because it so generalised the concept of and test for inherent 
patentability that in practice the requirement has been 
annihilated." 
I '  The NRDC decision is all the more remarkable for being 
unanimous. 
l 2  Yt would be unsound to the extent of folly to attempt to do so 
now [ie to impose a narrow fetter on the meaning of the term 
'manufacture'l. when science has made such advances that 
>, 
the concrete applications of the notion which were familiar in 
1623 can be seen to provide only the more obvious, not to 
say the more primitive, illustrations of the broad sweep of the 
concept": NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 271. 
l 3  "It is a r ~  inquiry not into the meaning of a word so much as 
into the breadth of the concept which the law has developed 
by its consideration of the text and purpose of the statute of 
Monopolies": NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252 at 269. 
l4 On the facts of the caie, the method for selectively 
exterminating weeds created an artificial state of affairs (greater 
than natural crop yield) which had "sensational" advantage in 
the area of cultivation, an economic endeavour. The new 
approach swept away d l  remaining vestiges of a so-called 
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In holding that a process (or method) invention 
that did not result in the production, improvement or 
repair of a vendible product was patentable subject 
matter,'' the High Court formulated some broad and 
flexible principles.'6 First; the process must offer 
some advantage that is material, in the sense that the 
result of its application is of value in the field of 
economic endeavour; secondly, the method or 
process itself must belong to the practical rather 
than the fine arts; thirdly, the application of the 
method or process must have as its end result an 
artificial effect or a discernible artificial state of 
affairs. Rephrased, a post-NRDC definition of 
patentable subject matter other than a product, might 
therefore read: 
"[A] process or method that does not belong to 
the fine arts, the application of which results in 
the production of an artificial state of affairs, and 
that is of economic significance." 
This leaves us with an important question: how 
does the general statement of principle in NRDC 
affect allegedly patentable subject matter that falls 
within a category tfaditionally excluded by case 
iaw?17 
agricultural and horticulturai process exception, that had been 
based on a narrow linguistic interpretation of the term 
"manufacture". 
IS Contrary to what had been thought before; the "production, 
repair or improvement of a vendible product" formula was 
expressed most strongly by Morton J in Re GEC's Application 
(1942) 60 RPC 1. The actual invention at stake in NRDC was a 
process to improve, by the application of known chemicals, the 
crop yield of arable land by selectively exterminating weeds 
without affecting the cultivated crop. 
l6 in dealing with precedent, the Court essentially proceeded by 
way of a broad reinterpretation of the terms "vendible product" 
as meaning any economically significant result. The judgment 
quotes Evershed J in Rantzen 's case (Re Rantzen S Application 
(1946) 64 RPC 63) at 66 where- 
"[Hie spoke of the expression 'vendible product' as laying 
proper emphasis upon the trading or industrial character of 
the processes intended to be comprehended by the Acts - 
their 'industrial or commercial or trading character' as Lloyd- 
Jacobs J himself described in Re Lenard's Application 
(1954) 71 RPC 190 at p 192." 
The judgment also quotes Evershed J in the Cementation 
case (Re Cementation Co Ltd's Application (1945) 62 RPC 
151), where he said that a product meant "that which is produced 
by any action, operation or work; a production; the result". 
The other commonly employed meaning of the word product, 
ie a thing, was not relevant in this context (NRDC (1959) 102 
CLR 252 at 272). 
I' Such as, for instance, discoveries, laws of nature, methods of 
The answer must be that the question cannot be 
resolved by categorising the invention and then 
automatically attaching the requisite consequence. 
Rather, reference should always be had to the 
general purpose underlying the doctrinal 
development of specific categories of exception, 
which is reflected by the general principles 
identified in NRDC. In some cases, the old category 
might be subverted by the NRDC principles to the 
extent that it should be swept away, such as the 
agricultural and horticultural "exception" under scrutiny 
in NRDC itself. In others, categorisation may be a 
useful guide but should not, without more, determine 
the outcome. As a result, subsequent to NRDC, 
categorisation-based misconceptions concerning 
patentability that have accumulated over time without 
clear jurisprudential support have been eliminated 
by the application of its general principles.'8 
The NRDC rules in an era of "hyper- 
innovation" 
When formulating its general principles, the High 
Court was conscious of the fact that it was operating 
in an era of rapid technological change. But it may 
not have foreseen quite how rapid and far-reaching 
scientific and technological change would become 
in the decades following on from the late 1950s. The 
same technological and scientific advances which 
the Court was so confident of being able to assess 
on the basis of technical legal principles, today 
attract considerable public controversy and give rise 
to far-reaching policy questions.'9 Nonetheless, 
calculation or theoretical schemes, plans, mathematical formulae, 
mere presentations of information and so on. 
l8 See eg IBM Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents 
(1991) 22 IPR 417, dispelling a long standing public 
misconception concerning patentability of computer 
implemented inventions; see also the rejection of the reasoning 
in CCOM v Jiejing at first instance by the Full Federal Court on 
the appeal in that case. About both cases, more further below. 
l9 See, for instance, the introduction of a private member's Bill 
in the Senate, by Senator Stott-Despoja (Dem), that would have 
had the effect of rendering unpatentable naturally occumng 
genes; or naturally occurring gene sequences; or descriptions of 
the base sequence of a naturally occurring gene or a naturally 
occurring gene sequence (Patents Amendment Bill 1996). See 
also the deliberations and 1992 report of the House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Industry, Science and 
Technology: Genetic Manipulations: the Threat or the Glory?. 
The Committee recommended against excluding organiims from 
patentability. See also the controversy surrounding the patenting 
February 2002 43 
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in 1990, the Commonwealth Parliament effectively 
gave the NRDC approach its stamp of approval.20 
It confirmed, rather than confined, the judicial 
power to adapt the concept of patentability to new 
and revolutionary advances in science and 
technology. 
Since 1990, the courts have had to confront a 
number of important questions relating to new or 
intended developments. They have attempted to 
apply the general NRDC principles, but in the 
process it has become apparent that these are vague 
and embryonic. The difficulties inherent in applying 
them in a court of law are illustrated by the 
diverging conclusions of various judges deciding 
unresolved questions. 
By way of illustration, this article focuses on two 
areas: patents for computer-implemented inventions 
and patents for methods of medical treatment. IBM v 
smith2' and CCOM v ~ i e j i n ~ "  concern computer- 
implemented inventions; Anaesthetic Supplies v 
~ e s c a r e ~ ~  and Bristol-Myers Squibb v F H 
~ a u l d i n ~ ~ ~  concern medical treatment methods. 
Applying NRDC to emerging technologies 
CCOM v Jiejing and IBM v Smith: 
computer-implemented inventions 
CCOM v Jiejing was concerned with a computer- 
implemented invention covered by a petty patent. 
The claims were effectively directed to process or 
method steps (although expressed as "means for" 
claims) for the production of Chinese characters on 
of genetically altered life forms, both in Australia and in Europe. 
That is not to say that the 1990 provisions did not import some 
changes in the approach to patentable subject matter, particularly 
in relation to the so-called threshold test of inventiveness on the 
face of the specification: see NV Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken v 
Mirabella International Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 655 (Philips); 
Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v Ramset Fasteners (Aust) 
Pty Ltd (1998) 194 CLR 171. 
'' IBM Corporation v Smith, Commissioner of Patents (1991) 
22 IPR 417. 
'' CCOM Pty Ltd v Jiejing Pty Ltd (1994) 27 IPR 577 
(Cooper J); on appeal: (1994) 28 IPR 481 (Spender, Gummow 
and Heerey JJ). 
23~naesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 28 IPR 383 
(Lockhart and Wilcox JJ, Sheppard J dissenting); at first 
instance: Rescare Ltd v Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd (1992) 
25 IPR 119 (Gummow J). 
24 Bristol-Myers Squibb Co v F H Faulding & Co Ltd (2000) 97 
FCR 524; 46 IPR 553. 
a Visual Display Unit (VDU). The invention 
allegedly overcame a well-known practical word- 
processing problem in a language consisting of a 
very large number of individual characters. 
In spite of the flexibility inherent in NRDC, prior 
to 1991 there was a common perception that 
Australian patents law (and in particular the Patents 
Act 1952) did not, or did only in a very restricted 
category of case, admit computer-implemented 
inventions as patentable subject matter.25 However, 
the decision in IBM v Smith revealed that the 
attitude of the Patent Office had been too 
re~ t r i c t ive .~~  Burchett J held that the correct 
approach was not to start from the question whether 
the invention contained some theoretical knowledge, 
then to ask whether the rest of the claims were 
drafted in a manner that sufficiently limited the 
claim over that theoretical knowledge to a specific 
practical application. Rather, the invention should 
be looked at a s  a whole, whereupon the NRDC 
principles should be applied to it. In other words, 
did the process claimed result in the creation of an 
artificial state of affairs, being of significance to the 
economy, and did not belong to the fine arts?27 
25 The Patent Office set restrictive guidelines for the examination 
of computer-related inventions, based on the US test in 
Re Freeman 197 USPQ 464 (1978), as modified or refined in In 
re Walter 205 USPQ 397 (1980), and in Re Abele and Marshall 
214 USPQ 682 (1982). The test consisted of two steps: first, 
does the claim directly or indirectly recite an algorithm; 
secondly, if yes, then does the claim consist of more than the 
presentation and solution of the algorithm? If no, then no amount 
of post-solution activity or application will save the claim from 
being found not to recite patentable subject matter because it is 
no more than an idea or mathematical or mental process, a basic 
tool of scientific and technological work and thus not patentable. 
A claimed process that resulted in a number, even if that number 
can later be used in a practical application, was not patentable 
subject matter, but if it represented a physical thing, numerical 
representation was no bar to patentability. In other words a 
process that resulted in a number was only patentable if that 
number represented a physical reality. 
The law in the US was for a long time rather confused (see 
L R  Turkevich, "An End to the 'Mathematical Algorithm' 
Confusion?"l995] ElPR 91), but now the US courts have 
overruled the old tests as well: see AT&T Corp v Excel 
Communications Inc US Ct of App, FC, 14 April 1999, cert den, 
USSC, 12 October 1999. 
26 Burchett J's decision reversed the decision of a delegate of the 
Commissioner of Patents to reject the patent application: 
see Re International Business Machines Corporation [I9911 
AlPC 90-781 (JI Welsh). 
" In IBM v Smith, the process claimed a practical application: 
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The fact that the claims contained a theoretical 
element should not colour the inquiry from the 
outset. On the facts, the method of producing an 
improved curve on a VDU was relevant to the 
economy, resulted in the 'creation of an artificial 
state of affairs, and could not be said to belong to 
the fine rather than the practical arts. 
In CCOM, the invention claimed was based on 
categorisation of Chinese characters by stroke type 
and by the pre-ordained order of applying the 
individual strokes to write a complete Chinese 
character. This was a well-known linguistic 
technique applied to ordinary writing.'" 
The invention worked by the operator entering, on 
keys adapted for that purpose, stroke type categories 
in a specific order, whereupon the computer would 
retrieve and display characters from the database 
with the relevant stroke type applied in the relevant 
order and number. These might in fact be too 
numerous .all to be displayed on screen, so that 
further research criteria might have to be entered to 
further limit the retrieved characters until the single 
desired character rett~ained.'~ The claims of the 
invention were drafted in terms of relevantly 
constituted "data storage means", "display means", 
a "keyboard" and then by describing the operation 
of the whole by entering information (search 
criteria) by operation of the keys on the keyboard?' 
eventually to achieve the display of a set of desired 
Chinese  character^.^' 
the production of an improved curve on a computer VDU; this 
was an artificial state of affairs, of economic significance, 
and could not be said to belong to the fine arts. 
28 The normal way of finding a character in a Chinese language 
dictionary is by breaking it down into @rush-)strokes, and stroke 
count numbers, and further into so-called radicals, ie 214 basic 
character components not being strokes comprising the 
character. 
29 CCOM was in fact an action in infringement and counterclaim 
for invalidity. The allegedly infringing invention differed from 
the claimed invention in that it integrated further data concerning 
the frequency of occurrence of certain Chinese characters, thus 
reducing the need to input further search criteria, and increasing 
the efficiency of the system. 
" Consisting of keys modified in a manner that was nonetheless 
not novel. 
31 The specification did not recite any algorithm, although 
indirectly algorithm(s) would form part of the claimed process, 
since it was to be executed on a computer. There is in fact no 
reason why, as far as the question of patentable subject matter is 
concerned, it should make any difference to the approach taken, 
that the claims and recite an algorithm (or, for that matter, some 
In his decision in CCOM at first instance, 
Cooper J of the Federal Court first isolated the 
essence of the invention: the linguistic exercise 
whereby the Chinese characters were categorised by 
stroke type and stroke order, and the use of such 
criteria to retrieve (that is, find) a specific Chinese 
character. He separately considered the use of computer 
hardware to achieve the result, and categorised that as 
using a computer in a conventional manner to 
reproduce mental processes.32 He then went on to say: 
"[Tlhe formulation of such criteria and their use 
as rules to organise and process data stored in a 
database in a conventional computer are the product 
of human intellectual activity lying in the b e  arts 
and not the useful arts" (emphasis added). 
What was essentially claimed was a known 
intellectual task, executed on a computer, something 
that did not amount to patentable subject matter.33 
The Full Court, in the appea1.h CCOM, took a 
different line, more akin to Burchett J's approach in 
IBM v Smith. It applied NROC principles to the 
invention as a whole. The specification effectively 
claimed a process that resulted in an artificial state 
of affairs, the generation of Chinese characters on a 
VDU; the ability to generate Chinese charactcrs in 
that manner was obviously of enormous economic 
significance; and the process did not belong to the 
fine arts. What was in fact claimed (the process as 
executed in a specific manner on a computer) was a 
practical application that included some theoretical 
knowledge, but it was not the theoretical knowledge 
as Pursuing a "holistic" method, and 
rejecting the approach that first isolates a theoretical 
element characterised as  the essence of the invention, 
other theoretical or mental steps) or not. 
. 
" CCOM (1994) 27 IPR 577 at 593. As the Full Court pointed 
out (at 511) his Honour here may have failed to make a clear 
distinction between the question of patentable subject matter and 
obviousness; that the result is obtained on conventional means 
not being of any significance to the former question. 
" CCOM (1994) 27 IPR 577 at 593. Cooper J derived some 
support from the decision of the German Federal Supreme Court 
in Re the Computer Generation of Chinese Characters [I9931 
FSR 315: there an application for a similar invention was 
dismissed on the basis that the invention was not of a technical 
nature. See also B Steckler, "Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs under German Law" [I9941 7 ElPR 293. 
34 In simple terms what was claimed was a practical solution to a 
well-known practical problem; that that solution contained some 
reference to theoretical knowledge or techniques that were akin 
to the fine arts was not a relevant concern. 
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the Full Court concluded that the claimed invention 
was: 
"[Plroper subject matter for the grant of letters 
patent according to the principles which have 
been developed for the application of section 6 of 
the Statute of ~ o n o ~ o l i e s . " ~ ~  
The Full Court also filled out the broad 
parameters of NRDC with references to past cases; 
since there were virtually no Australian decisions on 
the relevant point, reference was had to certain UK 
decisions handed down on the basis of the (pre- 
1977) Patents Act 1902 (UK), that did not expressly 
exclude computer programs as does the Patents Act 
1977 ( u K ) . ~ ~  Those decisions tended to support the 
point that more than a mental process was involved 
in claiming the process of application of certain 
3~ The Full Court also emphasised that the concept of "manner of 
manufacture" is now fully distinct from any question of 
inventiveness; obviousness is a separate ground of invalidity and 
not one contained in the central concept of invention (CCOM 
(1994) 28 IPR 481 at 511). However, since the decision in 
CCOM, the judgment in Philips (1995) 183 CLR 655 may be 
seen as having cast some doubt on that proposition, since the 
High Court accepted that the term invention (including an 
alleged invention) in Patents Act, s 18 (1) did require reference 
to a threshold test of inventiveness: in that way, a claim for a 
new use of a known substance for which its known 
characteristics make it suitable, was not patentable subject 
matter for lack of obviousness. However, the High Court said 
only that if there was a prima facie lack of inventiveness, there 
could be no reference to an invention or alleged invention; is this 
a case where there is such a prima facie lack of inventiveness? 
In CCOM the Full Court did consider an argument that the 
claim amounted to no more than the selection of desirable 
characteristics ("mere desiderata") of a computer program 
(the ability to search a database of the type described in the 
manner described), then claiming all computers present and 
future possessing those characteristics, an argument that smacks 
of Philips. The Full Court rejected the argument since the 
objection did not fit into any category of requirement of 
patentability; they did not treat the argument as one addressing 
the question of "manner of manufacture" or the threshold 
concept of invention as put forward by the High Court in Philips. 
In fact the decision of the High Court in Philips was only handed 
down on 9 November 1995; the decision of the Full Court in 
CCOM was handed down on 22 June 1994, whereas the decision 
of the Full Court of the Federal Court in Philips was handed 
down on 26 August 1993 (see [I9931 AlPC 91-025). Had the 
Full Court in CCOM had the guidance of the High Court 
decision in Philips, they would have had to consider the question 
differently, but would obviously have come to the same 
conclusion. 
'' International Business Machines Corporation's Application 
[I9801 FSR 564; Burroughs Corporation (Perkin's) Application 
[I9741 RPC 147. 
steps represented by a computer program on a 
standard computer, since the method as claimed was 
incorporated in the program and in apparatus in a 
physical form. The Court also highlighted the fact 
that whether the adaptation of a known process to a 
computer amounted to patentable subject matter 
should not be confused with the question whether it 
was novel or inventive to do so. 
The Full Court in CCOM thus advocated a 
flexible, non-technical approach to a new category 
of invention,37 entirely within the spirit of NRDC. 
The High Court in that case had issued a clear 
warning that the approach should not be based on a 
detailed linguistic analysis of the term "manner of 
manufacture", nor on opposing the term "discovery" 
.to the term "invention", because the distinction 
between those two terms was "not precise enough to 
be other than misleading".38 The question must 
therefore be asked, not in relation to some isolated 
"essence (or essential feature) of the invention", but 
in relation to the whole invention as circumscribed 
by its claims, and in light of what it attempts to 
achieve. Proposed new subject matters should be 
approached without artificial restrictions, taking into 
account that the courts are intended to respond to 
technological developments flexibly and with an 
open mind. 
Anaesthetic Supplies v - Rescare: human 
treatment methods 
Anaesthetic Supplies v Rescare (Anaesthetic 
Supplies) was concerned with the status of the so- 
called "(human) medical treatment exception" that 
purported to exclude methods for the treatment of 
human medical conditions from patentability,39 
either as not being subject matter suitable for the 
grant of letters patent, or because a patent would be 
"generally inconvenient". The case starkly reveals a 
central policy dilemma of patents law. On the one 
hand, a patent encourages (so the theory goes) the 
diffusion of new and useful technologies by the 
grant of a temporary monopoly. On the other hand, 
" That is, new, not in a historical sense, but as far as the 
application of patents law to it is concerned. 
38 See NRDC (1959) 192 CLR 252 at 264. 
'' The status of this so-called exception under Australian law 
was uncledr before Anaesthetic Supplies. For a comment on the 
case, see P Loughlan, "Of Patents and Patients: New Monopolies 
in Medical Methods" (1995) 6 AlPJ 5. 
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it does this by restricting the right of a person who 
benefit from it to actually use it. This is true in every 
area of technology, but in terms of medical 
treatment, it means that the development of 
treatment methods is to be encouraged by granting 
the patentee the legal right to deny a sick or injured 
person appropriate treatment. The grant of a patent 
could obstruct a doctor's duty to make the optimal 
therapeutic decision for the treatment of a suffering 
patient. 
Pharmaceutical substances claimed as products 
have long been patentable, despite the fact that 
much the same arguments that can be brought to 
bear against medical treatment patents could also be 
applied to A question which arose in 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v F H Faulding reveals the 
potential inconsistency: can a process or method of 
administering a known drug, applied to the 
treatment of a disease for which it was previously 
not known to be effective, be claimed as patentable 
subject hatter? Such an "invention" would have to 
be claimed as a method rather than a product, but 
would in a sense be very close to being a new 
product. 
Are methods or processes of medical treatment of 
significance to the economy, ie concerned with, or 
par: of, an economic activity, or are they of a 
different nature?41 Prior to NRDC, it was thought 
that a process, to be patentable, had to result in the 
production of a "vendible product", which a (cured) 
human body strictly speaking was not. However, 
since NRDC, the question is whether the process 
resulted in an artificial state of affairs of significance 
to the economy; medical treatment could therefore 
A problem facing applicants who had invented a new use for a 
known drug (ie treatment of a disease for which the drug had not 
been known to be effective before) was that such an invention 
could only be claimed as a process, since the product was not 
new or inventive; but such drafting then ran the risk of falling 
foul of the human treatment exception; that is what happened in 
The Wellcome Foundation Ltd v Commissioner of Patents 
(1980) 145 CLR 520. 
41 AS Cooke J pointed out in Commissioner of Patents v The 
Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1983) 2 IPR 156 (NZ AC), a case 
that was concerned with a patent for an invention which 
consisted of the use of a drug previously used for the treatment 
of malaria now claimed for the purpose of treating leukemia: 
"[Tlhere remains a deep seated sense that the art of the 
physician or the surgeon in alleviating human suffering does 
not belong to the area of economic endeavour or trade and 
commerce": at 175. 
arguably qualify. Nonetheless, there was some 
reluctance to accept without demur that treating 
disease in human beings was an economic activity, 
although this much was asserted in some Australian 
cases.42 Before Anaesthetic Supplies, one reason 
why the question had not been squarely addressed 
by an Australian court, was the judicial development 
of a distinction between prophylactic and cosmetic 
treatment of the human body, which allowed the 
courts to avoid the issue.43 
But in Anaesthetic Supplies there was no 
avoiding it: the invention consisted of combined 
process/product claims for the continuous 
administration of oxygen, by means of a ventilation 
mask, to sufferers of obstructive sleep apnea, 
a potentially fatal medical condition that is not 
uncommon.44 The difficulty related to those claims 
42 See for instance the (obiter) statement of Barwick CJ in Joos v 
The Commissioner of Patents (1972) 126 CLR 61 1 (Joos) to the 
effect that it was clear that medical treatment has economic 
effects, eg in time off work, insurance and so on. In NRDC itself, 
another obiter statement suggested that surgery or other 
processes for treating the human body may well lie outside the 
concept of invention "because the whole subject matter is 
conceived as essentially non-economic" (at CLR 275). 
43 Both in Joos (1972) 126 CLR 611, and in Maeder v Busch 
(1938) 59 CLR 684, the invention concerned was a method for 
cosmetic treatment of human hair. In NZ, on the other hand, the 
Appeal Court, in Commissioner of Patents v The Wellcome 
Foundation Ltd (1983) 2 IPR 156, felt itself bound by the 
authority of an English decision, Re C & W's Application (1914) 
31 RPC 235, that set up a clear exception to patentability for 
human treatment methods. The Court did not feel that it could 
reverse such a clear position, since it would constitute a major 
shift between competing interests, which should be left to 
Parliament and not the courts. 
Similar sentiments were expressed in two English cases of a 
later vintage than Re C & W's Application: Eli Lilly & 
Company's Application (19751 RPC 438, where the reason for 
the exclusion of methods of medical treatment was said to be 
based in ethics rather than in logic (at 445) and Upjohn 
Company (Robert's) Application [I9771 RPC 94, where 
Russell U said that it was well established that a method of 
treatment of a human ailment with a known substance was not 
capable of being an invention under the Statute, and that if this 
should be changed, it should be done by Parliament (in fact the 
Parliament in the UK later expressly excluded medical treatment 
from patentability: see Patents Act 1977 (UK)).  The Federal 
Court in Anaesthetic Supplies did not see itself as similarly 
bound by the English decision, and found no binding authority 
in any Australian case. 
44 This condition. known as "OSA". is associated with extreme 
snoring and occurs when a patient suffers repeated near-choking 
on the tongue or soft palate while sleeping. In some cases the 
result can be fatal. 
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that concerned the method or process of 
administering the oxygen. The Full Federal Court 
held by majority that methods of human treatment 
were patentable subject matter. The relevant claims 
were thus valid and enf~rceable.~' 
Lockhart J pointed out that there was little reason 
- the Court technically not being bound - to follow 
the approach exemplified by the English cases 
E l i ~ i l l ~ , ~ ~  ~ p j o h n ~ ~  and Schering AG's 
~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n , ~ ~  si ce they did not provide a 
satisfactory basis on which to halt the development 
of the law in this area. Furthermore, there was no 
difference in principle between the process 
invention considered in NRDC and the method of 
treatment of the human body at issue here. There 
was also no justification in law or logic for a 
distinction based on whether a substance produced a 
cosmetic or prophylactic result. NRDC had made it 
clear that it was essential that the law remain 
flexible. As Lockhart J put it: 
"Australian courts must now take a realistic view 
of the matter in the light of current scientific 
development and legal process; the law must 
move with the changing needs and times".49 
The formulation of strict categories of exclusion 
was not consonant with such an approach. 
His Honour pointed out that in the debates leading 
up to the 1990 repeal of the Patents Act 1952, 
Parliament had had ample opportunity to exclude 
medical treatment processes from patentability and 
had not done so, having only excepted humans and 
biological processes for their generation.50 It was 
not for the courts then to usurp Parliament's will and 
formulate such an exception. In the result, the claims 
disclosed patentable subject matter." 
4s (1994) 50 FCR 1; 28 IPR 383: Wilcox and Lockhart JJ, 
Sheppard J dissenting. At first instance, Gummow J had held 
that the patent was valid and that there was no basis for 
distinguishing medical treatment methods: Rescare Ltd v 
Anaesthetic Supplies Ply Ltd (1992) 25 IPR 119. The issue of 
patentability was considered upon a counterclaim for invalidity 
in an infringement action. 
46 [I9751 RPC 438. 
47 [I9751 RPC 94. 
48 (1971) All ER 177. 
49 (1994) 50 FCR 1 at 19. 
See Patents Act, s 18 (2). 
" Although the general issue of patentability of human processes 
was canvassed, a necessary proviso which Lockhart J '  himself 
stressed was that the claims were mostly product claims in 
substance and form. It may be so that when considering the 
To Wilcox J, the fact that Parliament had had the 
clear opportunity to exclude methods of human 
treatment in 1990 was also of vital significance; 
courts should be hesitant to introduce a gloss on 
Parliament's intention by reference to very general 
principles relating to the meaning of "manner of 
manufact~re".~~ NRDC7s rationale had clearly swept 
away the "vendible product" limitations that had 
been imposed previously on the concept of "manner 
of manufacture" and which had inspired the decision 
in Re C & W s  ~ ~ ~ l i c a t i o n ~ ~  and an appeal court 
was therefore free to decide the issue. Having come 
to that conclusion, the way forward was clear: 
judges are ill equipped to make ethical or political 
judgments since they lack special expertise in that 
conclusions to be drawn from the case, the fact that the few 
process claims were closely associated with product claims 
should be borne in mind. The main thrust of Lockhart J's 
argument was that a new use for an old thing could be patentable 
if there was ingenuity and novelty in discovering that the old 
thing may be used to produce a new effect; in such cases an old 
thing may be treated as new, its hitherto unknown potential 
being discovered by ingeniosity. Such a new and useful effect 
was an artificially created state of affairs providing economic 
utilitv and thus a "manner of manufacture". 
52 In some ways this is an argument that could easily be turned 
around: since Parliament did not provide a detailed list of 
exceptions to patentability, it demonstrated its clear intention 
that the courts continue the process of determining what is 
patentable subject matter on the basis of the very general terms 
"manner of manufacture", and continue to interpret thkm in line 
with the general principles developed for that However, 
as the subsequent parts of his Honour's judgment demonstrate, 
he may rather have meant that no gloss on parliamentary 
intention should be imposed by reference to detailed exceptions 
to the very general principles relating to the meaning of "manner 
of manufacture". 
s3 (1914) 31 RPC 235. The invention concerned in that case was 
a method for the extraction of lead from the human body. Wilcox 
J explained in some detail why he felt free to decide the issue 
unconstrained by precedent. In Australia, NRDC swept away the 
"vendible product" limitation, only requiring that there be "some 
advantage which is material, in the sense that the process 
belongs to the useful art as distinct from a fine art - that its value 
to the country is in the field of economic endeavour" (NRDC 
(1959) 102 CLR 252 at 275). It thus swept away the rationale 
that had underpinned Re C & W's Application. 
The UK courts, however, although accepting NRDC, took the 
view that the rule excepting medical treatment methods was so 
entrenched that its abrogation should be left to Parliament. 
The situation in Australia was the exact reverse, in that courts 
felt that they should not usurp Parliament's role by inserting such 
an exception, rather than by excising it. Once the rationale of the 
exception in Re C & W's Application disappeared, proper 
judicial policy required the courts to reconsider the issue. 
48 AUSTRALIAN I TELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL - Volume 13 
r 
I 
The Technicality Requirement, Patent Scope and Patentable Subject Matter in Australia 
area, and should therefore not entertain such 
arguments to add an exception to a statute that 
Parliament had had ample opportunity to consider. 
Arguments based in ethics and social policy rather 
than law, put forward by some other judges, were, 
in the opinion of Wilcox J, unpersuasive. 
One of those "other judges", on the same Bench, 
was Sheppard J. He did canvass some of the broader 
issues at stake in formulating his dissenting opinion, 
although his ultimate decision that a medical 
treatment exception did exist was based on 
practicality rather than morality or social policy. 
His conclusions were based on an analysis of the 
question whether granting medical treatment method 
patents would be "generally incon~enient",~~ rather 
than whether they were drawn to patentable subject 
matter sensu stricto. Nonetheless, Sheppard J also 
focused on the nature of the profession of medicine, 
to determine whether it is an economic pursuit in the 
sense required by NRDC.~' Medicine emphasises 
research and teaching, and: 
"[Tlhere is a willingness on the part of the 
members [of the profession] to share information 
about new discoveries and new methods of 
treatment. This is particularly so in relation to 
surgical procedures of innumerable kinds and in 
relation to the management of people who are 
suffering from serious di~ease."'~ 
There was wide dissemination of knowledge both 
nationally and internationally through teaching and 
publication, and: 
"[Tlhe subject matter of all this, although it may 
have its commercial elements, is the treatment of 
human suffering. It has direct bearing on the 
well-being of the nation. Medical research and 
54 His Honour analysed the relevant cases and pointed out that 
Barwick C1 in Joos (1972) 126 CLR 61 1 and Somers J in Wellcome 
Foundation (1983) 2 IPR 156 had proceeded on the basis that the 
relevant question was that of "general inconvenience" ((1994) 50 
FCR 1 at 40). In this context, he stressed that OSA was a potentially 
life-threatening disease ((1994) 50 FCR 1 at 41). 
" Whether the correct approach is to ask what category of 
pursuit the invention belongs to, and whether that category is 
kconomicai~~ significant, is-maybe not the approach envisaged 
by NRDC; a more precise reflection of the ratio in that case may 
bk to ask whether the invention itself offers some material 
advantage the value of which lies in the field of economic 
endeavour. In other words, is the process of the practical arts; 
and is the result economically significant; although in the result 
the two approaches may differ little. 
'"1994) 50  FCR 1 at 40. 
treatment have a long history which is replete 
with distinguished examples afforded by a great 
many dedicated men and women".57 
Sheppard J, however, did not make these points 
with a view to formulating a conclusion concerning 
the NRDC principles; rather, he considered them 
relevant to the issue of general inconvenien~e.~~ 
The arguments that led Sheppard J to exclude a 
patent on that basis were: first, that the grant of a 
monopoly in an invention may lead to the denial of 
its use and hence to unnecessary suffering or even 
death; and secondly, that this result would be 
contrary to the medical profession's essential nature, 
which is not the pursuit of economic gains. 
"I cannot think that this is really what the medical 
profession as a whole would seek to achieve. 
Its whole history is a denial of that proposition 
[ie that a patentee should be given the right to 
deny medical treatment]." 
His Honour thus appeared to see the grant of a 
patent as a restraint on free dissemination and use of 
practical knowledge, in an area of human endeavour 
where such exchange, teaching and sharing of 
knowledge was essential to combating human 
suffering and disease. In so doing, he appeared to 
discount two professed policy aims of the grant of 
patents: first, the "incentive function", that is that 
the grant of monopolies encourages investment in 
the development of technologies beneficial to 
humankind, be it in medicine or in other areas; 
secondly, the information-diffusion function of 
patents through enabling disclosure. In contrast to 
the other two judges, Sheppard J accepted 
57(1994)50FCR 1 at41. 
Lockhart and Wilcox JJ did not pronounce themselves on the 
question of "general inconvenience". That the grant of a patent 
may logically lead to the denial of treatment appeared not to 
concern them. Maybe this was partly because of the close 
association between product and process patents in the invention 
concerned: it may seem unlikely that if the patented product is 
supplied, there would not be an implied or express licence to 
actually use it in the manner specified; whoever wanted to apply 
the method, would have to acquire the product first. It must be 
said that it would appear somewhat contrary to logic to grant a 
patent for a product (which may equally result in the denial of 
treatment with that product) without more ado, but not to grant a 
patent in the process to use that product. In adopting this 
approach he seemed to treat the two questions as alternatives, 
rather than seeing the question of general inconvenience as an 
issue only raised consequent upon a determination that an 
invention is a patentable "manner of manufacture". 
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competing arguments: "although it may have 
commercial elements", medical treatment was 
essentially aimed at the relief of human suffering, 
and thus not economic; at the very least, patenting 
such a method was inconvenient. Furthermore, the 
free exchange of information and free use of 
practical knowledge, were an essential element of 
medical treatment. His Honour's convictions 
concerning the relative merits of the arguments 
inevitably led him to conclude that the invention in 
suit did not concern patentable subject matter, 
within the context of the whole of s 6 of the Statute 
of Monopolies. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb v F H Faulding: 
human treatment methods 
In Bristol-Myers Squibb v F H Faulding (Bristol- 
Myers Squibb), the same issues were to the fore. 
The relevant claims were drawn to a new method of 
dosing and administering the known anti-cancer drug 
taxol. Black and Lehane JJ (on the appeal) followed 
the majority decision on appeal in Anaesthetic 
Supplies, favouring patentability of medical treatment 
methods. They stressed that the most cogent 
arguments leading to that conclusion were twofold: 
"It is in those circumstances that we consider that 
we should adopt and apply the view of the 
majority in Rescare: a view reached after a close 
and persuasive analysis of principle and 
authority. In taking this course, we are fortified 
by two considerations. The first of these is what 
seems to us to be the insurmountable problem, 
from a public policy viewpoint, of drawing a 
logical distinction which would justify allowing 
patentability for a product for treating the human 
body, but deny patentability for a method of 
treatment . . . This seems particularly the case 
where, as here, the claim is for an invention for 
the administration of a product. 
The second compelling consideration is the 
very limited extent to which the Parliament dealt 
with patents with respect to the human body 
when it enacted the 1990 Act, bearing in mind, 
too, that it did so at a time when the long- 
standing practice in Australia was (as we are 
informed it still is) to grant patents for methods 
of medical treatment of the human body."59 
As to the specific argument that methods of 
human treatment patents were "generally 
inconvenient", Black and Lehane JJ had this to say: 
"It is perhaps tempting to posit a possible special 
area in which, for example, an entirely novel and 
simple procedure, capable of saving many lives 
by its application as first aid, might be denied 
patentability even though otherwise meeting the 
requirements for a valid patent. It may be that the 
'certain methods of treatment of the human body' 
to which passing reference is made in Ramset 
(at 190) would fall into this category. Even here, 
however, although at first sight it is easy to see 
how it could be argued that it was 'generally 
inconvenient' for a simple, novel and 
dramatically life-saving method of treatment to 
be denied patentability on the footing that such a 
thing should be available universally and without 
restriction, the difficulty remains of drawing any 
logical distinction between a method of treatment 
and a patentable pharmaceutical product that 
produces the same beneficial results. 
More specifically, if (say) an antivenene for 
spider bite is patentable, on what ground can a 
new form of treatment for the same life- 
threatening bite be denied? The second 
consideration, referred to above, would also seem 
to remain as an obstac~e."~~ . 
Finkelstein J in Bristol-Myers Squibb held that 
methods of human treatment clearly fell within the 
concept of manner of manufacture. The more 
relevant question was whether they were "generally 
inconvenient". His Honour said: 
"[Plerhaps the most powerful argument against 
patenting is the idea that a patient may be denied 
medical treatment that she needs. It is certainly 
the most emotive of the arguments. It presumes 
that a medical practitioner may be unable to 
obtain the right to use a particular process, or 
may not be able to do so within due time, and 
therefore will be unwilling to undertake the 
process on her patients for fear of legal a~tion."~'  
But on the other side of the argument was: 
"[Tlhe underlying objective of patents, namely 
the promotion of science and the advancement of 
the arts for the general welfare of the State. As a 
59 Bristol-Myers Squibb (2000) 97 FCR 524 at 529-530. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb (2000) 97 FCR 524 at 530. 
6' Bristol-Myers Squibb (2000) 97 FCR 524 at 568. 
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general principle there can be no doubt that 
patent protection is desirable to encourage new 
medicines and surgical methods. It is an 
inescapable fact that inducement is necessary to 
encourage the great expense that is now required 
to evaluate and investigate the utility of many 
new medical processes and surgical methods."62 
But in the end his Honour rightly stressed that at 
the core of the debate lies the question of who 
should properly determine suitability for patenting, 
given the limited ability of a court of law to take 
evidence on the social and economic issues 
involved: 
"I do not believe that in a controversial issue 
such as is raised by the present argument, I would 
be abandoning my responsibility as a judge to 
follow this approach and to hold that if public 
policy demands that a medical or surgical process 
should be excluded from patentability, then that 
is a yatter that should be resolved by the 
~arl iament ."~~ 
Interestingly enough, that is exactly what has 
happened in the US; where, since 1996, medical 
practitioners enjoy immunity from liability for 
patent infringement while performing a medical or 
surgical procedure.64 
NRDC's limitations in a post-industrial 
economy 
Maybe the differences between the various 
judgments in CCOM, IBM v Smith, Anaesthetic 
Supplies and Bristol-Myers Squibb simply reflect 
the novelty of the questions involved. Certainly, the 
majority of the decisions reflect the courts' 
determination to respect the spirit of NRDC. The 
essence of the power bestowed by Parliament on the 
courts is to develop flexible rules that evolve with 
technological change. Each invention must be 
considered on iis merits on the basis of the broad 
NRDC principles, and not on the basis of the 
question whether it fits into one or another rigidly 
62 Bristol-Myers Squibb (2000) 97 FCR 524 at 568. 
63 Bristol-Myers Squibb (2000) 97 FCR 524 at 569. 
" (1996) Public Law 104-208. See also T Lithgow, "Patent 
Infringement Immunity for Medical Practitioners and Related 
Health Care Entities" (1997) Jurimetrics JournaI 251; 
G Mossinghoff, "Remedies under Patents on Medical and 
Surgical Procedures" (1996) 78 JPTOS 789. 
circumscribed category of invention or technology. 
Determining what is patentable subject matter is a 
process now shorn of artificial fetters and a priori 
limitations. In an era of rapid technological change 
this is a prudent approach; however, the differences 
between the judgments mentioned above reflect the 
inherent dificulty of the task, rather than simply its 
novelty. 
There seem to be two main difficulties with the 
principles in NRDC. First, they are broad, and thus 
vague and uncertain; secondly, it is not clear that 
they are adequate and appropriate in an era of more 
rapid, more ubiquitous and more startling innovation 
than could have been envisaged in 1959. As to the 
first point, how does NRDC limit the subject matter 
suitable for the grant of a patent? 
The technicality requirement 
Although NRDC completed a long judicial 
process of divorce from linguistic interpretation of 
the term "manufacture", that term is still central in 
its implied limitation of patentability to a practical 
process and some technical result. In terms of 
NRDC, a process is one that 
"offers some advantage which is material, in the 
sense that the process belongs to a useful art as 
distinct from a fine art - that its value to the 
country is in the field of economic endeavour"; 
"has as its end result an artificial effect"; 
"[results in] an artificially created state of 
affairs. ... the significance of the product is 
economic: it provides a remarkable advantage 
... for one of the most elemental activities by 
which man has served his material needs"; " 
"the result possesses its own economic utility". 
It would be fair to conclude that in NRDC, the 
grant of patents is still limited to technological 
innovati~n,~%nd does not extend to organisational, 
business, theoretical or scientific innovation as sucheh7 
hS NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
" The Merriam- Webster Online Collegiate Dictionary definition 
of "technology" is: 
"la: the practical application of knowledge especially in a 
particular area; b: a capability given by the practical application of 
knowledge; 2: a manner of accomplishing a task especially using 
technical processes, methods, or knowledge." 
h7 The emphasis must be on the terms as such. Christie argues 
that the only requirement is that of implementation, and that 
"this requirement of implementation is of no practical 
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This was nicely illustrated by Heerey J in 
Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (Welcome 
~ea l -~ ime) ."  His Honour rightly rejected the 
attempted gloss on NRDC which would have 
required a "physically observable effect" rather than 
an artificial state of affairs to result from a patented 
process. The invention concerned did result in such 
an artificial state of affairs, namely the issuing of 
cards to consumers making available many different 
loyalty programs at retail outlets. The patent did not 
disclose a business method as such, ie a scheme or 
plan for carrying on a business (which would not be 
patentable), but a device and method to be used in a 
business. In other words, it was a technological 
innovation and not a business innovation. 
In binding patentability to technological 
innovation, the courts perpetuate (admittedly they 
have only followed the lead of the legislator in the 
Patents Act) an historically-bound view of 
innovation. The patent system grew and developed 
in the golden age of manufacturing technology, and 
was aimed at promoting practical technological 
change in the context of value adding through 
manufa~turin~.'~ Neither the High Court nor any other 
court has as yet evinced any intention of moving 
beyond this view of innovation, ie of moving away 
from a requirement that there be some technical 
element to an invention, some reduction to a practical 
environment. But is this requirement no more than a 
pointless technicality in a post-industrial economy, a 
meaningless relic from a bygone age of industrial 
innovation? Or does it retain a solid theoretical 
foundation and significant purpose? 
significance" (see A Christie, n 10, at lo), certainly in an era 
where most business is conducted on or by means of computers. 
" Welcome Real-Time SA v Catuity Inc (2001) 51 IPR 327. 
"'   he concept of manufacturing has of course expanded through 
the ages, and thus also the area of applicability of patents (for 
instance, agriculture is now arguably an area of manufacture, as 
NRDC confirms). See, inter aha, E Walterscheid, "The Early 
Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I)" 
(1994) JPTOS 697; R Hauhart, "The Origin and Development of 
the British and American Patent and Copyright Laws" [1983) 
5 Whittier L R 539; P Long, "Invention, Authorship, "Intellectual 
Property" and the Origin of Patents: Notes Toward a Conceptual 
History" (1991) Technology and Culture 32 at 846; G Mandich, 
"Venetian Patents (1450-1550)" (1948) JPTOS 30 at 166; 
G Mandich, "Primi Riconoscimenti Veneziani di un Diritto di 
Privativa agli Inventori" (1958) Revista di Dirino lndustriale 
1 at 101. More generally see Sherman & Bently, The Making of 
Modern Intellectual Property Law (CUP, 1999). 
The technicality requirement in a post- 
industrial economy 
A number of differences between industrial and 
post-industrial economic structures are relevant to 
this debate." First, manufacturing forms a less 
important part of most industrial activity, whereas 
services take an ever growing place. Secondly, in 
the post-industrial, or "information" or "knowledge" 
economy, the productive management of knowledge 
and information is a vital factor in the operation of 
markets and in the success of firms. Competition 
and innovation at firm-level are increasingly centred 
around the management of client relationships and 
service delivery. Thirdly, the rate of technological 
innovation, ie the rate of technological substitution7' 
and of technological growth,n increases 
exponentially. Fourthly, the science quota of 
technology increases, ie technological innovation 
increasingly derives from theoretical study and 
scientific discovery, rather than from learning by 
doing. Fifthly, market structure is increasingly 
determined by technological "networks", ie there is 
greater technological interdependence between 
firms, and between firms and clients. Lastly, in the 
context of factors three to five, firms attempt to 
establish and maintain market power by creating 
technological dependence (eg by standardisation 
based on proprietary technology or by exploiting 
first mover advantages through discount pricing and 
other pro-active marketing strategies). 
The patents system has responded to these changes 
to a degree. If the management of knowledge and 
information is a crucial facet of the post-industrial 
age, and management of information is largely 
technological in the computer age, then it makes sense 
that computer implemented inventions and software 
inventions should be patentable. The courts, in 
Australia and elsewhere, have accepted this. 
But other factors find less resonance in the 
evolution of patents law. For instance, the direct 
70 The term "post-industrial" is used here, rather than 
"information" economy, because it gives a less restrictive ambit 
to the identification of factors that typify our present industrial 
context. 
71 The rate at which new technology is substituted for existing 
technologies. 
72 The rate at which new technologies are added to already 
existing technologies. 
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importance of scientific inquiry to technological 
innovation has greatly increased, yet scientific 
discoveries are not directly patentable as such, even 
where their potential usegl applications have been 
identified and explained in theory. This is for two 
main reasons: first, science-related claims must be 
limited to a specific practical application which is 
described in an enabling disclosure; secondly, 
an element of inventiveness in the application of 
science to practical ends must be shown. These 
requirements exist irrespective of the size of the 
investment required in systematic scientific inquiry. 
As a result, a large fraction of that private investment 
in research remains unprotected by the property 
structures of patents. 
A further example of the lack of responsiveness of 
patents law to new industrial structures relates to the 
relative growth of services as opposed to 
manufacturing. This has not resulted in service 
innovations being patentable as such. For example, 
the technicality requirement - or in terms of 
Australian law, the search for an "artificial state of 
affairs" - continues to'stand in the way of patents over 
business methods as such. It is a misconception to 
think that the recent decisions of State Street in the 
US and Welcome Real-Time in Australia stand for 
anything else. 
Abandoning the technicality requirement 
If the technicality requirement, whatever precise 
form it may take, is ill-adapted to a post-industrial, 
service-based economy, should it be abandoned? 
To take business methods per se as an example of 
service inventions in general, there is a number of 
arguments against allowing monopolies in such 
"inventions". Are they warranted on the basis of the 
traditional incentive and publicity functions of 
patents law? Business method innovations may not 
require the same high levels of investment in 
research and development as does ~kchnology, nor 
similar levels of investment and risk in their 
implementation in business. There are also obvious 
difficulties in terms of usefulness (or "utility"), 
novelty and obviousness. Furthermore, there is a risk 
that the grant of business method patents could result in 
monopolies over whole sectors of the economy.73 
73 For a critique of business method patents, see R Merges, 
"As Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property 
In other words, the grant of such monopolies may be 
too broad in scope. It is precisely in its impact on the 
scope of patent monopolies that the real and persistent 
usefulness of the technicality requirement lies. 
The technicality requirement limits the scope of 
patent monopolies, and this in an era in which the 
expanding scientific content of new technologies 
encourages demands to allow more theoretical and 
thus broader patents. This effect is also well 
illustrated in the context of more "theoretical" 
patents, thus broader patents, ie patents that claim a 
monopoly over a large number of possible 
applications of a specific scientific breakthrough. 
The current casus belli in that regard is the scope of 
claims for applications of genetic in f~rmat ion .~~  
How should the courts operating under the flexible 
NRDC standards approach this issue? With 
considerable private investment in scientific 
research, and the increased scientific contents of 
technology, claims over known but unelaborated 
applications of scientific breakthroughs may appear 
justified. The real difficulty with such patents is 
again their scope, ie the effect they will have in 
interdicting investment in innovation by 
competitors, ultimately affecting public welfare. In 
this context as well, the remaining beneficial 
function that the technicality requirement fulfils is 
its limiting effect on the scope of patent monopolies. 
So even though it is arguably an anachronism in a 
post-industrial economy, it may be reasonable to 
retain the technicality requirement as a limitation on 
Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform" (1999) 
Berkeley Technology Law Journal 577. See also R Dreyfuss, 
"Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?", unpublished 
paper referred to in Drummond J's paper cited at the start of this 
article, presented at Fordham University School of Law, 8th 
Annual conference on International Intellectual Property Law 
and policy, April 2000, p 10. 
74 In general, see G Van Overwalle, The Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions in Europe (Leuven Law Series, 
Vol 10, Leuven University Press, 1997). The question is whether 
claims drawn to the application of genetic information (ie a gene 
sequence that codes for a certain characteristic) for any use in 
prevention of any disease disclose valid patentable subject 
matter. See also C Roberts, ''The Prospects of Success of the 
National Institute of Health's Human Genome Application" 
[I9941 1 EIPR 30; N Jones, "Biotechnology Patents: a Change of 
Heart" [1994] EIPR 37; T Roberts, "Broad Claims for 
Biotechnological Inventions" [I9941 ElPR 371; R Nott, 
"The proposed directive on biotechnological inventions" [1994] 
ElPR 191. 
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patent scope. This equates to an argument that 
claims not limited to a technical application are too 
broad, and that overly broad monopolies have a 
negative aggregate welfare effect. Is that in fact so? 
Patent scope 
It is almost commonplace that the scope of patent 
monopolies vitally determines whether a patent 
system as a whole has a positive aggregate welfare 
effect. In simple terms, a patent claim that is too 
broad will result in a monopoly that operates as a dead 
hand on innovative and competitive activity of 
competitors, but too narrow a patent will not provide a 
sufficient incentive to invest in the production of new 
inventions. Ideal, or at least "appropriate" patent scope 
will fall somewhere in between. 
Patent scope and inffingement 
Patent scope is a familiar concept in the 
construction of claims to determine infringement. 
Courts have accepted that to limit the scope of the 
monopoly to the exact wording of a claim would 
commonly render the patentee's monopoly illusory: 
a literal approach is thus not appropriate, although 
how closely the claims must be read will vary with 
their precise wording. Instead, the courts have 
adopted a substantive approach, finding 
infringement where the pith and marrow of an 
invention has been reproduced in all its essential 
integers. By so doing, courts have strengthened the 
position of the patentee by ignoring variations that 
are not material. The scope of the monopoly is 
arguably further widened by subjecting the 
specification to a purposive interpretation, ie by 
determining whether, in the opinion of a notional 
objective informed reader of the specification, some 
one or another element would require literal 
adherence or not.75 These techniques are similar in 
effect to the application of the theory of equivalents 
in US patent law. They represent the courts' 
attempts to adjust the scope of patent claims to 
permit them to fulfil their function while not 
imposing excessive costs on society. 
75 Although the purposive approach can be read as a subset of 
the substantive approach rather than an extension of it. 
Patent scope at the application stage 
While scope is central to infringement, it is only 
addressed indirectly in the context of validity, 
ie when examining whether claims disclose novel, 
inventive and useful patentable subject matter. 
The scope of patent claims is limited in various 
ways. First, as explained above, by requiring that an 
application must disclose some technical or practical 
element, effectively preventing the grant of more 
theoretical, and thus broader scope patents?6 
Secondly, by the requirement of enabling disclosure, 
ie that the description of the invention must be 
sufficiently precise to enable an informed reader of 
the specification to replicate it. Thirdly, by way of 
the requirements of novelty and inventiveness: if the 
scope of a patent is too broad, it will be difficult to 
escape an allegation of pre-emption or obviousness. 
Fourthly, by the requirement that the application 
disclose an invention on the face of the specification 
(the Philips threshold test).n Thus, appropriate 
patent scope is not an express factor determining 
patentability; but various technical legal devices 
indirectly affect the potential scope of patents. 
Should patent scope be so constrained, or should the 
constraints be abandoned to some degree, for 
instance by removing the technicality requirement? 
The economic effect of hroad patents 
The incentive theory 
Incentive theory posits that the market for 
information (of which patents are a sub-species, 
being information of a particular kind), is imperfect, 
because information is an inexhaustible public good 
with very low marginal costs of reproduction, and 
non-excludable. Less than optimal investment in the 
production of knowledge (ie, in this context, 
in research and development) results, since returns 
from innovation cannot be captured. The creation of 
property rights78 allows the person generating new 
'"2 IPR 449 at 451, as quoted from Commissioner of Patents v 
Microcell Ltd (1959) 102 CLR 232. As an example, the 
invention in Philips (see n 20) is apt: the Court found that that 
was "nothing but a claim for the use of a known material in the 
manufacture of known articles for the purpose of which its 
known properties make that material suitable." 
77 See n 20; and now also Advanced Building Systems Pty Ltd v 
Ramset Fasteners (Aust) Ply Limited (1998) 194 CLR 171. 
7R Patents are property rights of a kind; they are monopolistic in 
5 4 AUSTRALIAN I TELLECTUAL PROPERTT JOURNAL - Volume 13 
1 
The Technicality Requirement, Patent Scope and Patentable Subject Matter in Australia 
knowledge or information to exclude others and 
drive up its marginal cost. This enables recovery of 
the sunk cost of research, and the generation of 
profits. 
In this form, the incentive theory is rather 
reductionist. There may be under-investment in 
innovation in some areas of technology in the 
absence of property rights, but this may not be the 
case in others.79 There are other factors that 
encourage innovation even in the absence of 
property rights, such as natural imitation lag; 
oligopolistic market structure; the structural 
advantage of being a market leader (so-called first 
mover advantage); availability of other methods of 
exclusion such as secrecy; network economic 
effects; natural monopolies (eg in rail technology) 
etc. Keeping this in mind, the effect of 
undifferentiated patents is hard to gauge. The grant 
of patent monopolies may in fact largely amount to 
an incedtive to reallocate resources devoted to 
knowledge generation, rather than to increase such 
resources overall. 
But the biggest difficulty is that whereas 
incentive theory may provide some support for the 
grant of patents as an incentive for innovation, 
it says little about the ideal size of the incentive. 
Nor does it identify at what stage along the 
discovery-invention-innovation-diffusion continuum 
a monopoly over knowledge should ideally be 
granted. These are two facets of one question: what 
is the ideal scope of a patent monopoly? A more 
subtle analytical framework is required to address 
this question. 
Rent-dissipation and the race to invent 
Contemporary economic debate concerning the 
economics of patents has moved beyond a static 
rewardlincentive analysis in a search for more subtle 
 alternative^.^' Rent-dissipation theory provides one 
such alternative. Focusing on the rent-seeking 
behaviour that the grant of patent monopolies 
induces, it attempts to generate conclusions in 
relation to ideal patent scope. At its core lies the 
proposition that the aggregate public welfare effect 
of a patent system is critically dependent on the 
timing of the patent application. 
The requirement of novelty (and thus pre- 
application secrecy), the absolute nature of the 
granted right, and the first to file structures of 
patents law all contribute to a race to invent and 
hence duplication of research effort. But patents law 
sets up a winner-take-all system: only the first to file 
obtains the prize of a patent monopoly. There is a 
consequent risk that the overall economic advantage 
gained by the use of property rights to encourage 
innovation is dissipated by the wastage resulting 
from duplication of research effort. Secrecy during 
the pre-application stage contributes to the wastage 
because there is imperfect information amongst 
competitors as to their respective positions in the 
race." A patent system must take all this into 
account and provide an incentive whose overall cost 
to society (by duplication) does not outweigh overall 
benefit (by innovation). Critical in striking this 
balance is the scope of granted patents, ie the 
breadth of the monopoly reward; and critical to the 
scope of a patent is the timing of the patent 
application. 
Striking a balance: timing of the application 
According to rent-dissipation theory, the more 
theoretical the inventions that can be patented, the 
earlier applications will be filed, and the broader the 
scope of the ensuing patents will be. Thus, the more 
theoretical the patented invention, the earlier the 
race to invent will cease, because the winner is 
known, with a consequent reduction of the wastage 
the sense that any person, even the independent developer, may 
be excluded from the use of an invention; they are also 
assignable; they grant the owner rights of action in enforcement; 
but they are limited in time and not guaranteed valid. 
79 This is  reflected in the findings of studies that have 
investigated industry managers' attitudes towards patents; see eg  
RC Levin et al, "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial 
Research and Development" (1987) 3 Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity 783. 
Pa See in particular the rent-dissipation approach as explored by 
Grady and Alexander and others: see eg  M F Grady and 
Jl Alexander, "Patent Law and Rent Dissipation" (1992) 78 
Virginia Law Review 305; RP Merges, "Rent Control in the 
Patent District: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis" 
(1992) 78  Virginia Law Review 359. See also DL Martin, 
"Reducing anticipated rewards from innovation through patent: 
or less is more" (1992) 7 8  Virginia Law Review 351, and the 
seminal article by EW Kitch, "The nature and function of the 
patent system" (1978) J of L & Eco 20 at 165. On the economics 
of patent scope in general, see R Merges and R Nelson, "On the 
complex ec6nomics of patents scope" (1990) Columbia Law 
Review 9 0  at 839. 
*' These criticism are based on Grady and Alexander, n 80. 
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from duplication. However, there is a countervailing 
effect: the broader the scope of the monopoly, and 
thus the size of the rent to be gained, the more firms 
will enter the race to be first and the more each 
entrant will invest in winning the race. In other 
words, although the duration of duplication may 
decrease with earlier filing, the volume of 
duplication may increase. 
Thus, the focus of analysis becomes the timing of 
the patent application, which will be determined by 
how theoretical the law allows a patented invention 
to be. The filing decision can be expressed as a 
firm's choice between secrecy and publicity. 
The longer reliance on secrecy is extended and thus 
the decision to apply for a patent is put off, the later 
the moment the competitors in the race to invent 
receive the signal to desist, and the greater the 
wastage by duplication of research effort, and vice 
versa. The more theoretical claims are legally 
permitted to be, the earlier a firm will switch from 
secrecy to publicity by lodging a patent application. 
Were it not for the excessive incentive effect of 
higher rents to be derived from broad patents, more 
theoretical patents would be advantageous in terms 
of overall economic effect. But in fact, what is 
required is a patent with a scope that falls in 
between pure theory and narrow application, so that 
a balance is struck between reducing wastage by 
shortening the period of duplication and increasing 
wastage by increasing the incentive. 
It may be that the present approach to patents, 
which does not allow purely theoretical patents, but 
requires some practical application of knowledge, 
crudely approximates this middle position. From this 
perspective, the technicality requirement as it is 
applied now helps to strike the balance between 
theory and application. Although a patented invention 
can incorporate theoretical knowledge (eg an 
algorithm) or scientific discovery (eg genetic data), it 
cannot consist of only that. The knowledge must be 
applied to a practical end that is technical in nature. 
Coordination of R & D in the post- 
application stage 
To add another dimension to the analysis, the focus 
can be shifted to the potential role of the patentee as the 
coordinator of inventive and innovative activity. 
In the pre-application (or pre-invention) stage, 
secrecy results i n  excess duplication and a lack of 
coordination of research activity (ie a failure to 
direct all resources most efficiently to one goal). 
In the post-application stage, disclosure under the 
protection of property rights empowers the patentee 
as licensor to coordinate post-invention 
development, thus improving the efficiency of the 
overall innovation effort. This supports the grant of 
broad or more theoretical patents, since the patentee 
will then be able to adopt the role of an efficiency- 
enhancing coordinator of further developments at an 
earlier stage. There is a long lag time between 
invention and successful commercialisation. Many 
improvements and developments are required before 
a patent becomes the basis for a viable commercial 
product. The more effectively development activities 
are coordinated, the greater the overall welfare effect. 
An early patent also enables others to use the 
information from the enabling disclosure in their 
own non-infringing research, which is of particular 
relevance in an increasingly scientific world. 
It allows the coordination of independent research 
groupings engaging in non-infringing research to 
occur more efficiently since it provides earlier 
knowledge about different research strands. This is 
all the more significant when so few firms are able 
to conduct all aspects of research themselves, ie they 
tend to be narrowly focused, but interdependent. 
Doubts about coordination of R & D by the 
patentee 
But again there is the problem of the size of the 
rents gained from a broad patent. Even though early 
application (and thus grant of broad or theoretical 
claims) arguably improves innovation coordination, 
excessively broad (and thus early) patents may 
increase overall costs because of excessive 
investment in the pre-patenting stage with an eye to 
securing windfall rents (thus encouraging greater 
levels of duplication). Some of those rents would be 
derived not from commercialisation, but from an 
impost on the innovation activities of other 
researchers. 
Also, whereas a broad patent may have an 
efficiency-enhancing effect in the post patent stage, 
in the pre-patent stage participants in the race to 
invent will arguably become less inclined to 
cooperate and exchange information as the size of 
the prize, and the potential losses from failure to 
win, increase. 
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Furthermore, very broad patents may in fact deter 
any inventing around or improvement-related 
research in the post-patent phase, leaving the 
patentee with nothing to coordinate other than his 
own research and development. But the patentee, 
having invested heavily in obtaining the potential 
windfall rents from the broad patent, may have 
insufficient resources to effectively carry on its own 
post-invention, innovation-orientated research. 
Since many of the most crucial breakthroughs in 
product development actually occur at the post- 
invention stage, this effect on the finding of 
improvements may be a particularly negative factor. 
Because of the considerable lag between invention 
and return through commercialisation, investment in 
invention will remain unproductive for a long time, 
and should not be over-encouraged. Inventions should 
ideally be made when the market is ready for them, ie 
if there is a reasonable prospect of commercialisation 
(innovation) within a reasonable time lag; this favours 
late grant and thus narrow rather than broad patents. 
A related concern is that excessive emphasis (and 
investment) is placed on a section of the invention- 
innovation-commercialisation continuum which is not 
relevant to the other (and also capital intensive) stages 
of development. 
In any case, and this is probably the most 
significant point, where the coordination theory 
emphasises the benefits flowing from the 
coordinating role of the patentee, it may be 
fundamentally flawed. One of its major premises, 
that the patentee will act as an efficiency-enhancing 
coordinator of research and development in the 
post-patent stage, is at best speculative. It may be 
that this coordinating activity is not likely to operate 
with any economic efficiency overall, since it will 
engender considerable transaction costs. It may also 
be that the principal interest of the patentee is not so 
much to coordinate the post-patent research effort, 
but to derive maximum short-term returns from it, or 
to block the research and development and 
investment in improvements that potential licensees 
might make. 
Broad patents' effect on innovation 
From that perspective, aggregate welfare will be 
more effectively enhanced by encouraging the 
"follnw-on" or "improvement7' inventor, rather than 
the initial inventor.82 This will reduce the losses 
suffered by the losers in the race to invent, because 
much of the knowledge generated in the pre- 
invention stage may still be used autonomously even 
after grant of the patent. Wastage from duplication 
will be reduced, and entrants in the race to invent 
will be more able to continue to innovate even after 
the winner is known. It may be that the coordination 
occurs more effectively between owners of rights in 
narrow application patents rather than between the 
owner of a broad patent and those wanting to do 
research and development work in relation to the 
invention covered by that patent.83 
Broad patents over certain kinds of technologies 
(eg basic research or diagnostic tools) may directly 
affect the research capacity, not only of commercial 
competitors, but also of not-for-profit research in 
universities and public institutions, constituting an 
unwarranted restraint on research rather than on 
commercial competition.84 In other words, and this 
is of crucial importance, at least in some cases, it is 
clear that the impact of broad patents extends 
beyond imitation, not to coordinate but to restrain 
innovation by other  researcher^.^^ 
Again, no "strong" conclusions can be drawn by 
analysing the effect of patent scope on post- 
application research activity. It is certainly not 
incontrovertible that broad patents will enhance the 
efficiency of post-grant innovation. In fact, in the 
author's opinion, on balance the arguments favour 
R2 This blocking effect of broad patents is commented on in the 
literature: see eg J Barton, "Patents and Antitrust: a Rethinking 
in light of Patent Breadth and Sequential Innovation" (1997) 
Antitrust Law Journal 65 at 449. See also R Merges and 
R Nelson, "Market Structure and Technical Advance: the Role of 
Patent Scope Decisions", in T Jorde and D Teece (eds) Antitrust, 
Innovation and Competitiveness (1992), p 185. 
R"cc~rding to Scotchmer, broad patents will fatally decrease 
the incentive for firms other than the first innovator to invest in 
research and development in second generation products, and: 
"[Slince the first innovator might not have expertise in all 
applications, second generation products are likely to arise if 
more researchers have incentive to consider them." 
This is an incentive that would be removed if the first innovator 
had too broad a patent: see S Scotchmer, "Standing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law", 
(1991) Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 at 29. See also 
M Lemley, "The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual 
Property Law" ( 1997) Texas Law Review 75 at 989. 
'' Barton cites a number of examples in biotechnology and 
computer programs: see n 82, at 449-450. 
8.5 This is the essence of the point that Scotchmer makes: see n 83. 
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narrow rather than broad scope patents, and hence 
retention of the technicality requirement as one 
method of limiting patent scope. 
Regulatory advantages of early publication 
of broad patents? 
If it is accepted that more theoretical and thus 
broader patents will result in earlier filings and thus 
earlier public disclosure of new technologies, some 
advantages in terms of assessment and regulation of 
technology, and the early development of industry 
standards may flow from this. A regulatory 
framework may develop in a more timely fashion.86 
This is of particular relevance in the context of 
genetic modification patents, but is also relevant in 
other areas, the patent system functioning as  a 
partial early warning system to regulators and 
public opinion.87 Investment in, further development 
can then occur in a clear regulatory context, and not 
subject to legality risks.88 Early warning (through 
patent publication) about competing technologies 
could also promote determination of technological 
standards and prevent duplication in a race to 
appropriate industry-standard technology. 
However, these are advantages that are tangential 
and indirect, and may only apply to a few 
technologies that have a high regulatory risk factor 
or are potential industry standards. In any case, the 
regulation of the use of technology should arguably 
remain a concern outside patents law. 
The patent system seems to sensitise public opinion 
concerning environmental, ethical and health issues surrounding 
new technologies, as was the case in Europe in relation to the 
patenting of genetically manipulated life forms (eg the so-called 
oncomouse). 
See eg concerning the tension between environmental 
reporting requirements and confidentiality in intellectual property 
law: N Atkinson, B Sherman, "lntellectual Property and 
Environmental Protection" [I9911 5 EIPR 165. See also 
N Hettinger, "Patenting Life: Biotechnology, lntellectual Property 
and Environmental Ethics" (1995) Environmental Affairs 22  at 
267; AWells, "Patenting New Life Forms: an Ecological 
Perspective" [I9941 3 EIPR 1 1  1 ;  S Crespi, "Biotechnology 
Patenting: the Wicked Animal Must Defend Itself' [I9951 EIPR 
431; M Collin, "Using Intellectual Property to Improve 
Environmental Protection" (1991) Harvard J of L & Tech 4, 193. 
See concerning the tension between administrative and 
liberal/neutral legal technical approaches to reward for innovation 
C Amp, Innovation, Policy and Law (Cambridge, 1993). 
X8 For instance in relation to labelling requirements for GMO's. 
Tentative conclusions a bout patent scope 
The arguments favouring grant of broad patents 
are not a sufficient basis for advocating divergence 
from the established legal factors that restrict 
patentable subject matter. The technicality 
requirement is one of these factors. Although 
arguably it is outdated in the present industrial 
context, strong arguments favour its retention as one 
of a constellation of well-established legal-technical 
instruments (such as also novelty; see above Patent 
scope at the application stage) that decision makers 
manipulate to shape patent monopolies of 
appropriate scope. Although its ultimate purpose 
may be economic in that it helps to mould a patent 
system with a positive aggregate welfare effect, the 
technicality requirement can be assessed by well- 
established methods of judicial reasoning and 
extrapolation from legal precedent. This avoids 
courts being required to hear and assess economic 
evidence as such. 
It is true that in modern times patents law has 
never proceeded on the basis of a specific economic 
inquiry into the desirability of some proposed 
monopoly. Since the process of patent grant is 
ultimately legal rather than administrative, that is 
appropriate. However, this is not to say that there is 
never room to examine arguments related to the 
economics of patent scope expi-essly in the context 
of determining whether a patent should be granted 
or is valid in its proposed form. In the context of the 
present debate, it is arguable that, in a narrow 
category of case, empirical evidence should be 
admitted to establish that a proposed patent 
monopoly of broad scope will adversely affect 
innovation as opposed to imitation in a given 
industrial or research sector. Such an inquiry could 
proceed under the "general inconvenience" limb of s 
6 of the Statute of Monopolies. It could result in a 
patent being rejected even where it otherwise meets 
all requisite legal standards. 
Patents scope and general inconvenience 
In such cases, evidence would have to be called 
concerning the concrete effect that a monopoly in a 
claimed invention may have on the research and 
inventive activities of other researchers, whether in 
industry or the public sector. By this, the author 
means not general evidence concerning hypothetical 
effects on innovation or market conduct in relation 
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to nominal patents of the type proposed, but the 
effects of the actual patent on real research activity. 
A patent should be refused if the evidence establishes 
that patent grant would have an effect on innovation 
would have a measurable adverse effect on innovation 
in a given sector. 
Such evidence will only be relevant if the effect 
of a proposed patent on the research and innovation 
activities of researchers in a certain sector goes 
beyond that of a patent of appropriate scope. 
In other words, a court will have to distinguish 
between the intended effect of a patent, ie to restrain 
imitation of the patented product or process for the 
term of the monopoly, and the undesirable effects of 
patents of excessive scope. No doubt there are many 
forms that evidence directly relevant to this issue 
could take; that question is best addressed in the 
context of a real case. Examples of areas of 
technology where the issue could arise are proposed 
patents:over broad diagnostic or research tools in 
biotechnology; or proposed patents claiming 
potential uses of genetic data. 
Conclusion 
The question of patent scope is of critical 
importance to a well-functioning patents system that 
has positive aggregate welfare effects for society as 
a whole. Patents with inappropriately broad scope 
will result in excess wastage because of duplication 
of research investment and over-investment in a race 
to gain windfall profits, and stymie research and 
innovation by private and public sector researchers 
in the post-invention stage. This is not the intended 
effect of the patent system. 
The courts in this country have the ability to 
adapt patentability requirements to changes in 
science and technology. NRDC sets out the basic 
factors that must be satisfied. One of these is the 
"technicality" or "practicality" requirement. 
Although this long-established factor is arguably out 
of step with the information economy, it deserves to 
be retained because it is one of a number of factors 
that have a limiting effect on the scope of patent 
monopolies. All these factors combined allow courts 
to fashion patents of acceptable scope over time, 
without having to address the arguments of 
economists overtly. 
However, although in most cases appropriate 
patent scope is a matter that is properly addressed 
by the application of legal criteria, of which the 
technicality requirement is one, it may be that in 
some rare instances this is not so. In some cases, the 
question of patent scope could arguably be 
addressed by way of direct evidence of the potential 
effect of a patent on the research and inventive 
activity of other researchers in the public or private 
sectors. Such an inquiry could be undertaken under 
the "general inconvenience" limb of s 6 of the 
Statute of Monopolies. 
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